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BOOK REVIEWS
THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY’S FOREIGN POLICY 
SINCE THE VIETNAM WAR
Mann, James. The Obamians: The Struggle inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New 
York: Viking, 2012. 416pp. $26.95 
James Mann walks the reader through 
the key foreign-policy challenges 
faced by the Barack Obama admin-
istration and outlines the evolution 
that has taken place in the presi-
dent’s approach to these issues.
He traces the post-Vietnam his-
tory of the Democratic Party’s foreign 
policy and describes the three different 
generations that come together in the 
present administration: the Vietnam 
War generation, the post–Vietnam 
War generation, and the Obamians, 
who are identified by Mann as mostly 
campaign staffers, plus National Se-
curity Council officials Ben Rhodes 
and Denis McDonough. The third 
group’s foreign-policy experience is 
limited to the Congress, and its po-
litical reference points are September 
11th, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the 
2008–2009 financial crisis. The Viet-
nam War is ancient history to them.
Mann believes this third group most 
closely reflects President Obama’s 
own worldview. He notes that foreign-
policy “veterans were to discover that 
Obama relied to an unusual extent 
on his own informal network, the 
Obamians he had come to trust in the 
presidential campaign.” In fact, while 
Defense Secretary Bob Gates, National 
Security Adviser General Jim Jones, 
Deputy Secretary of State Jim Stein-
berg, and others have moved on, the 
core of officials that Mann describes 
as Obamians are largely still in place. 
Mann describes “two distinctive aspects 
of Obama’s foreign policy.” The first is 
that Obama is not “squeamish about 
employing American military power,” 
as the surge in Afghanistan, the war in 
Libya, and his campaign expression “to 
track down, capture, or kill” all show. 
The second is the concern on the part 
of both the president and the Obamians 
that America’s financial resources no 
longer allow the United States to exer-
cise its traditional postwar hegemony. 
Instead, they believe that on entering of-
fice they were faced with a “continuing 
effort to recast the United States’ role 
in the world in a way that fit America’s 
more limited resources.” Mann notes the 
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biggest change for the William Clinton 
administration alumni was grasping 
this new reality of declining resources. 
The author also chronicles some im-
portant missteps made by the Obama 
administration, arguing that the presi-
dent’s fixation on not repeating what 
the Obamians viewed as mistakes of 
the George W. Bush administration led 
them to downplay democracy early in 
their tenure. This led, in part, to being 
overly reticent during Iran’s Green Rev-
olution. Mann also describes how their 
initial approach to China was based 
on lessons learned during the Clinton 
administration. Unfortunately, they did 
not recognize that China had become 
much more confident during the eight 
years of the Bush administration, there-
by making their approach ineffective.
Mann spends a significant amount of 
the book dealing with Afghanistan and 
describing President Obama’s increas-
ing disillusionment with the war. 
Afghanistan, for candidate Obama, 
was the good war that had to be won. 
During the first policy review this 
remained the main theme, and the 
president, at least implicitly, endorsed 
a counterinsurgency strategy. However, 
when General Stanley McChrystal’s 
appointment as top commander in 
Afghanistan set in motion another 
review later that same year, President 
Obama was “forced to confront the 
implications of the counterinsurgency 
strategy: How many troops would be 
required, and how long would it take?”
President Obama comes into his own, 
according to Mann, with the 2011 war 
in Libya. Mann states that while Obama 
acknowledged the United States has 
little strategic interest in Libya, he also 
recognized that our “only . . . strategic 
interests on this issue lay in maintaining 
strong relationships with close allies.” 
Nonetheless, President Obama did not 
approve the initial plan for a humani-
tarian intervention, because his advisers 
admitted it was unlikely to work, but 
rather pressed for options that would 
accomplish the mission. The presi-
dent then personally worked out the 
division of labor among allied forces, 
in order to limit U.S. involvement.
Mann, looking back at his book Rise 
of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s 
War Cabinet (2004), concludes he 
was right when he described the 
2003 invasion of Iraq as “the outer 
limits of the expansion of American 
power and ideals.” Mann concludes 
that the Obama administration has 
been centrist, marking a new era in 
America’s relations with the world, 
“one in which primacy is not assured.”
The Obamians follows in the path of 
such books as Bob Woodward’s Obama’s 
Wars, in that it uses background inter-
views to provide a picture of the Obama 
administration’s foreign-policy deci-
sion making. While Woodward focuses 
on the Afghan-surge decision making, 
Mann looks at the evolution of the 
Democratic Party’s foreign policy since 
Vietnam and then places the Obama 
administration within that context. By 
doing so, James Mann has produced a 
book of value to both specialists and the 
general reader, contributing to a better 
understanding of the Obama adminis-
tration’s foreign-policy decision making.
AMBASSADOR JOHN A. CLOUD, RET.
Naval War College
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Cimbala, Stephen J., ed. The George W. Bush De-
fense Program: Policy, Strategy & War. Dulles, Va.: 
Potomac Books, 2010. 243pp. $60
There is no lack of analysis and opin-
ions when it comes to the presidency 
of George W. Bush, particularly now, 
during an election year. However, the 
concise and competent analysis found 
in this work provides an objective 
review of that pivotal period in history, 
one that helps the modern reader draw 
valuable insights applicable to America’s 
defense acquisition process and to 
the foreign policy and global strategy 
of the United States going forward.
Stephen Cimbala, distinguished profes-
sor of political science at Penn State 
Brandywine, has assembled a series of 
eleven essays by leading academics and 
analysts of the military-industrial com-
plex, who provide assessments of Presi-
dent Bush’s defense policy and strategy. 
This scholarly but thoroughly readable 
collection examines preparations for, 
and the execution of, war and regime 
change in Iraq, success and stalemate in 
Afghanistan, and the sobering effects of 
“transformation” on the Department 
of Defense. Additional insights into 
struggles within NATO and its relation-
ship with the United States, the U.S. 
relationship with Russia, the critical 
issues of nuclear proliferation and ter-
rorism, and the implications of foreign 
military sales complete this collection.
The editor sequenced the essays to 
provide first the context of the times, 
the political pressures, and the person-
alities of key members of the admin-
istration. These contextual essays are 
prefaced by an erudite commentary on 
defense planning, including the brilliant 
takeaway that the oxymoron “foresee-
able future” deprecates the ability of 
planners to make reliable resource-
allocation decisions. This chapter alone 
makes the book worthy of a place on the 
unofficial list of “books to read before 
reporting to a Pentagon tour.” The 
essays follow with a critical (if some-
times unnecessarily pejorative) look at 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 
behavior and his management of the de-
partment, along with the successes and 
failures of “transformation.” Afghani-
stan and Iraq are closely examined in 
several essays, in which are documented 
examples of Secretary Rumsfeld’s over-
reaching policies, his broken faith with 
uniformed leaders, and the system-
atic abuse of intelligence data used to 
fabricate the case for invading Iraq.
Subsequent chapters address future-
oriented defense strategy and policy 
topics that were germane during the 
Bush presidency and continue to have 
implications now. One essay examines 
the primary questions facing the NATO 
alliance, including out-of-area mis-
sions and the ongoing debate regarding 
burden sharing among member states 
as they transition the institution from 
a posture of collective defense to one 
of collective security. This is followed 
by three essays that address arms-
transfer policies and foreign military 
sales, weapons of mass destruction 
security, and U.S.-Russian nuclear 
arms control and missile defense.
This book will appeal to military 
and political scholars, but it also will 
be immensely appealing to the nov-
ice seeking insight into the national 
defense decision-making process. The 
lessons provided in this study are 
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directly applicable to current and future 
decision makers in the Pentagon, on 
Capitol Hill, and in the White House.
COMMANDER TATE WESTBROOK, USN
Assistant Director to the Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of the Navy–Financial Management and 
Budget (DASN-FMB)
Reveron, Derek S., ed. Cyberspace and National 
Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a 
Virtual World. Georgetown Univ. Press, 2012. 
246pp. $29.95
This new collection of cyberspace policy 
essays includes the works of fourteen 
scholars and thinkers who present a 
panoply of views into how cyberspace 
can be contemplated as policy, doc-
trine, and strategy. The essays are not 
U.S.-centric but include focused views 
of Russian and Chinese thought on the 
domain, as ably presented by Nikolas 
Gvosdev and Nigel Inkster, respectively. 
Additionally, James Joyner provides 
an excellent synopsis of American and 
European Union thinking on cybersecu-
rity and how these differing approaches 
affect not only national-level policy 
but also the debates within NATO. 
These perspectives lend texture to the 
questions of how cyberpower may be 
considered and how cyberpolicy may be 
crafted to be both credible and effective.
A section focuses on the legal aspects of 
cyberspace operations and the potential 
pitfalls of policy development. It pays 
particular attention to the concept of 
deterrence—an area that baffles policy 
thinkers and technical mavens equally. 
Of particular use is David Fidler’s 
chapter, which provides useful termi-
nology and definitions that help the 
layperson participate in legal-focused 
discussions on the cyberspace domain.
Derek Reveron’s editing deserves 
specific and laudatory mention. Rather 
than merely a collection of articles 
arranged by topic, he has produced a 
broad web of writings that shows the 
interaction of varied scholarly efforts, 
makes few restatements of the same 
facts, and brings the volume as a whole 
to bear on a variety of subtopics. 
Steven Bucci’s “Joining Cybercrime 
and Cyberterrorism: A Likely Scenario” 
lays out a useful rubric for understand-
ing the operational environment of 
cyberspace and employs time-tested 
“most dangerous/most likely” threat-
evaluation analysis. This chapter would 
be of particular benefit to planners and 
leaders looking to develop “tabletop” 
or other training events that would 
focus leaders on specific threats and 
the action, reaction, and counterac-
tion options available to them.
Chris Demchak writes about “cy-
bered conflict,” which I thought to be 
a most remarkable approach of how 
cyberspace should be contemplated in 
national security, either as a domain or 
as discrete operations. In it she raises 
the point that all conflict from now on 
will have some degree of cyberspace 
flavor. However, very little will actually 
be dominated by or within this do-
main. The key is how best to integrate 
cyberspace into a coherent strategy, 
recognizing cyberspace’s varied role. 
Her use of the term “cybered” is not 
random. It is a useful modifier and 
connotes “all sorts of systems of people, 
things, processes, and perceptions that 
are computer-related but not necessarily 
purely computerized.” More than any 
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one particular chapter, this contribu-
tion opens the policy aperture and 
offers a useful, broad term with which 
coherent policy may be developed.
BRETT J. PATRON
Yorktown, Va.
Haywood, Robert, and Roberta Spivak. Maritime 
Piracy. New York: Routledge, 2012. 184pp. $125
The resurgence of maritime piracy has 
generated a renewed interest in the 
subject across a number of different 
disciplines, including law, history, and 
security studies. Robert Haywood and 
Roberta Spivak’s work draws from each 
of these fields to provide a succinct 
overview of the issues surrounding both 
contemporary piracy and counterpiracy 
operations. The authors, both affiliated 
with the Oceans beyond Piracy project, 
focus on how pirates are able to operate 
in the twenty-first century in the face 
of all the advances in military technol-
ogy. Their answer highlights ineffective 
governance at the local and global levels, 
as well as outdated institutions and laws 
meant to deal with piracy. These fail-
ings have created gaps in the interna-
tional system that have allowed piracy 
to flourish over the past several decades. 
The authors provide a number of policy 
recommendations to help quell the 
threat. One recurring theme is the need 
for a global reform of the merchant-
vessel registry system. Historically, flag 
states have borne a large share of the 
responsibility for suppressing piracy. 
Since the end of World War II, how-
ever, open-registry states, also known 
as “flags of convenience,” have under-
mined this line of defense against piracy. 
While this book benefits in many ways 
from an interdisciplinary approach, 
some of its historical analysis is simplis-
tic or inaccurate. For example, the sec-
ond Opium War was not fought prin-
cipally because Great Britain felt that 
Chinese officials had violated its flag-
state rights during the famous Arrow 
incident, as the authors imply. They also 
attribute the rise in piracy around Hong 
Kong in the mid-nineteenth century 
solely to the fact that the Royal Navy re-
fused to intervene against pirates unless 
British interests were directly involved. 
This is a gross oversimplification of the 
issue. Such slips are perhaps unavoid-
able in a relatively short text that ranges 
from Bronze Age maritime history to 
best-management practices on board 
contemporary merchant vessels, but the 
authors may have been overly selective 
in their historical account to add cred-
ibility to their policy recommendations. 
That being said, this work is a valuable 
addition to the growing literature on 
contemporary maritime piracy. By cov-
ering a wide array of different topics, it 
serves as an excellent starting point for 
researchers interested in specific aspects 
of the subject. Furthermore, many of 
the policy recommendations will be of 
value to those interested in maritime se-
curity in general. Although some read-
ers may disagree with the authors’ belief 
that international organizations like the 
United Nations can play leading roles in 
suppressing piracy, these policy recom-
mendations merit consideration be-
cause of their originality and ingenuity. 
EDWARD LUCAS
American University
Washington, D.C.
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Rosen, Stephen Peter. War and Human Nature. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005. 
224pp. $23.95
Stephen Peter Rosen is Michael Kaneb 
Professor of National Security and 
Military Affairs at Harvard University. 
In this ambitious volume he attempts 
to counter the view that economic-
rationality models of human behavior 
adequately explain human decision 
making. He defines economic rational-
ity as the assumption that people “have 
a stable, ordered, and consistent set of 
preferences and that they have a stable 
way of making choices about how to 
use scarce resources in a manner that 
gives them the most utility for a given 
expenditure of resources.” Rosen at-
tempts to demonstrate the inadequacy 
of economic rationality to explain or 
predict human behavior by drawing 
on a wide range of empirical research. 
The book is organized into four major 
chapters. The first explores brain struc-
ture from an evolutionary perspective 
and in some depth. The central finding 
here is that for very good evolutionary 
reasons much of human decision mak-
ing is performed by the nonconscious 
portion of the brain. This clearly is a 
survival mechanism in an environ-
ment where danger and challenge 
must be rapidly assessed and action 
must be taken much more quickly 
than a linear and consciously analytical 
process would allow. The implication 
of this research for the overall project 
is a need to contemplate more deeply 
the limits of conscious and cogni-
tive aspects of decision making—we 
must think more on the role of eco-
nomic rationality in human choice.
The second chapter explores the ge-
netic and personality variations among 
individuals, stressing the degree to which 
such variables cause individuals to make 
different choices in the same situation 
and fact set. The third looks at the various 
ways different societies organize them-
selves and explores the degree to which 
varying forms of social organization 
cause different types of individuals with 
different styles of decision making to 
emerge as leaders. The last major section 
explores the mechanisms of determining 
political behavior of states. Rosen argues 
that in some forms of social organization, 
the decision-making styles and personal-
ity traits of individuals may be damp-
ened by mechanisms of social control, 
whereas in others they may be amplified.
Along the way, the book looks at the 
effects of emotion, memory, domi-
nance, testosterone, distress, depres-
sion, and varying time horizons, and 
the decision-making styles of tyrants 
(as contrasted with leaders in other 
forms of government). It is, in short, 
an attempt to synthesize a wide range 
of information from the biological and 
psychological disciplines to cause us to 
think more critically about the role of 
rationality in political decision mak-
ing. Because of the work’s broad and 
synthetic approach, the reader may 
sometimes be less than thoroughly 
convinced of the implications of such 
diverse studies for political decision 
making. The author acknowledges as 
much in stressing the book’s tentative 
and exploratory nature. As a pre-
liminary effort to temper excessively 
rationalistic narratives, however, Rosen 
has provided a valuable contribution 
and corrective to much political theory.
MARTIN L. COOK
Stockdale Professor of Professional Military Ethics
Naval War College
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Catsambis, Alexis, Ben Ford, and Donny L. Ham-
ilton, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Maritime Ar-
chaeology. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011. 
1,203pp. $150
The Oxford Handbook of Maritime 
Archaeology is a survey of the cur-
rent state of the field as seen by fifty-
seven scholars from across the globe. 
The volume is organized into seven 
parts: an introduction by the eminent 
American scholar George F. Bass, one 
of the pioneers of the field; a section on 
process, with fifteen topical chapters; 
on ships and shipwrecks, with sixteen 
chapters; on maritime culture and life 
ashore, with seven chapters; on matters 
“beyond the site,” with eight chap-
ters dealing with an eclectic group of 
topics ranging from maritime history 
to underwater tourism, international 
law, heritage site management, and 
museum issues; a single concluding 
chapter dealing with future directions; 
and finally, a section that includes 
both a glossary of ship terms and an 
appendix on scientific analyses and 
dating techniques. Each of the separate 
chapters includes an extensive and use-
ful selected bibliography, and there is 
a general index of the entire volume. 
Overall, this volume constitutes a 
major complementary work to James 
L. Delgado’s Encyclopedia of Underwa-
ter and Maritime Archaeology (British 
Museum, 1997, and Yale University 
Press, 1998), and as such it represents 
a benchmark by which to measure the 
growing sophistication of the field 
over the fourteen years that separate 
Delgado’s work from this one. As 
George Bass points out in his intro-
duction, maritime archaeology has 
become a worldwide methodologi-
cal approach, one that has grown 
from single-site research in the past 
fifty years. Its future now rests on the 
synthesis of geographically and chrono-
logically diverse data. At the same time, 
the volume demonstrates that not all 
its practitioners have yet transformed 
the breadth of their understanding 
in order to achieve this vision fully. 
This work suggests a number of impor-
tant and encouraging signs of matura-
tion within maritime archaeology. First, 
there is a growing appreciation that the 
field extends outward from underwater 
shipwrecks and is linked to a number 
of areas. These areas range from the 
concept of maritime cultural landscape, 
as explained by Christer Westerdahl, to 
the remains of ships that have sur-
vived ashore, as Delgado describes, to 
archaeological work being done on 
coastal sites to understand the littoral 
interaction between life afloat and 
ashore, to studies of ancient harbors in 
the Mediterranean, and the archaeology 
being done in shipyard sites. Second, 
and even more importantly, there are 
clear signs of important broad synthesis 
in topics where underwater archaeology 
is able to provide information missing 
from other sources. This welcome trend 
is evident in the chapters by Mark Polzer 
on early shipbuilding in the eastern 
Mediterranean, by Deborah Carlson 
on the seafarers and shipwrecks of 
ancient Greece and Rome, by Eric Rieth 
on Mediterranean ship design in the 
Middle Ages, by Susan Rose on medieval 
ships and seafaring, by Fred Hocker on 
postmedieval ships and seafaring in the 
West, and by Randall Sasaki on East Asia 
shipbuilding traditions during the era of 
Chinese maritime expansion. Curiously, 
few authors mention at any length the 
NWC_Winter2013Review.indd   132 10/31/12   9:48 AM
7
War College: Book Reviews
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
B O O K  R E V I EWS 133
maritime archaeological contributions 
to social history that constitute such 
a feature of terrestrial archaeology. 
As this handbook suggests, underwa-
ter archaeology is best known for its 
contributions to understanding ship 
construction in periods and places for 
which other sources are either scarce 
or nonexistent, but at the same time, 
additional areas are opening up for the 
field as it expands. The long section 
with fifteen chapters on the processes 
of maritime archaeology shows that the 
field is becoming increasingly complex 
and changing rapidly as new technolog-
ical capabilities are brought to bear. This 
work repeatedly displays the immature 
aspects of the field, with several authors 
suggesting that they prefer a closed 
and private field of inquiry and others 
noting the relative lack of analytical 
publication, the numerous investiga-
tions that have produced little in the 
way of written results. Nevertheless, this 
work provides room for optimism that 
more and more maritime archaeologists 
are moving beyond the earlier narrow 
foci on process, procedure, and intrinsic 
objects toward wider interpretations. 
Francisco C. Domingues, in his contri-
bution, touches on this point when he 
emphasizes the relationships of mari-
time archaeology to the broader study 
of maritime history, the study of man-
kind’s interaction with the seas, oceans, 
and waterways of the world. Indeed, 
maritime archaeology is one of the 
many complementary disciplinary ap-
proaches by which we can better under-
stand that basic theme in global history. 
It is a distinct methodological discipline, 
but its meaning must extend beyond 
its process and procedures, just as the 
work of an archival researcher or library 
reader extends beyond methodologies 
and processes. Maritime archaeology 
is a means to find greater understand-
ing and meaning in traces and remains 
that can be found in an underwater 
equivalent of libraries and archives, but 
to do so its results need to be merged 
with those from other complementary 
methodologies and processes. As is 
clear from this volume, practitioners 
of maritime archaeology have a way to 
go, but the reader is left with hope that 
there is movement toward that end. 
JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College
Gerwarth, Robert. Hitler’s Hangman: The Life of 
Heydrich. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 
2011. 393pp. $35
Reinhard Heydrich, Reich Protector 
of Bohemia and Moravia, favorite of 
Heinrich Himmler, and architect of 
the Nazis’ notorious “final solution,” 
stares out of a seventy-year-old pho-
tograph looking more movie star than 
monster. Yet monster he was, in a party 
of monsters. Any biography of this 
once-rising star of the Third Reich must 
ask and attempt to answer the question, 
How does a person become a monster? 
Robert Gerwarth does as well as any 
scholar in answering this question. 
He meticulously charts the course of 
Heydrich’s life. Heydrich’s childhood 
was relatively normal. His family held 
the values of the middle class, perhaps a 
bit more so than most, since his father 
ran a music conservatory. Heydrich ac-
cepted, along with most of his genera-
tion, the military myth of betrayal as 
an explanation for Germany’s defeat in 
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the First World War. The Depression 
brought his family the specter of want 
and uncertainty, as it did to hundreds 
of thousands of families. He developed 
a passion for sports, and throughout 
this period there was never any sign that 
Heydrich was destined for anything out 
of the ordinary, but when he joined the 
German navy as a cadet, as Gerwarth 
chronicles, Heydrich began to display a 
fierce ambition and an ability to identify 
opportunities for advancement and 
position himself to take advantage of 
them. Heydrich was clearly on a path for 
success when he was obliged to appear 
before a naval court of honor, as a result 
of a prior love affair that had surfaced 
after he announced an engagement—a 
minor scandal made worse by Hey-
drich’s arrogance before the court. 
Heydrich was stripped of the uniform 
that in many ways had defined him, and 
his potential for historic impact seemed 
slight. However, leaving the navy he 
found himself at a unique and eventu-
ally rewarding nexus of personal, state, 
and global changes. Heydrich’s fiancée 
and her family were passionate Nazis, 
and for Heydrich the party offered a 
new path to power, position, and a posi-
tive self-image. For the rest of his life 
Heydrich would commit himself to be-
coming a paragon of National Socialism. 
He would succeed far better than most.
Getting in at what amounted to the 
ground floor of the creation of the 
Schutzstaffel (SS), Heydrich rapidly 
rose in the organization, becoming 
a confidant and trusted agent of 
Heinrich Himmler. Gerwarth argues 
convincingly that Heydrich was not an 
ideologue when he joined the move-
ment, but he increasingly acted as 
an apparently true believer. Among 
Heydrich’s more interesting, and chill-
ing, attributes was a belief that the times 
called on true Germans to be hard, 
even ruthless, in reestablishing their 
place as the rightful rulers of Europe. 
Heydrich was also hardworking, 
athletic, personally brave, and fairly 
good-looking. Upon several occasions 
he disobeyed orders and flew combat 
missions with the Luftwaffe. He was 
quick to accept and master new chal-
lenges, particularly ones that would 
enable him to rise within the party 
structure or gain power. Increasingly, 
these involved the removal of Jews and 
other “undesirables” from the Reich. As 
the regime moved inexorably toward 
mass murder and genocide as policy, 
so too did Heydrich. He was respon-
sible for the Einsatzgruppen, special 
task forces that followed the advancing 
front rounding up intellectuals, profes-
sionals, politically suspect individuals, 
and—always, always—Jews. Impressed 
with pseudoscience and apparently 
obsessed with sanguinary percentages, 
Heydrich divided and subcategorized 
the inhabitants of Europe on the basis 
of the Aryan “purity” of their blood. 
Early ideas, such as transporting 
European Jews to Madagascar, quickly 
faded, to be replaced with murder on 
an industrial scale. By 1941 Heydrich 
had crafted the so-called final solution. 
For him the elimination of populations 
was also the road to increased personal 
power, advancement, and fame. It was 
also a personally fulfilling task, for he 
had come to hate these unarmed and 
all but helpless enemies of the state. 
To the German people Heydrich pre-
sented an image of the perfect National 
Socialist, secure in his roles as loyal 
servant of the people, good family man, 
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and warrior standing between loved 
ones and the war’s devastation. At 
dinner parties he was urbane, charm-
ing, and attentive to women. It was 
not surprising that he had affairs.
A workaholic, he became a master 
of political infighting, and Gerwarth 
chronicles how Heydrich continually 
and successfully employed this skill, 
which gained him many enemies and 
opponents, such as Admiral Wilhelm 
Canaris, the head of German military 
intelligence. He knew how to hold a 
grudge and how to take advantage of 
opportunities for advancement. Still, 
Gerwarth debunks the modern myth 
of competition and jealousy between 
Himmler and his protégé. Gerwarth 
quite early in the book also disproves 
allegations that Heydrich’s ethnic 
heritage included Jewish forebears.
Some readers may find Gerwarth a 
shade too empathetic with his subject, 
but it is important to note that it is all 
too easy to paint Heydrich as a mon-
ster born or to suggest that somehow 
the catalyst of National Socialism was 
required to create him. The author 
reminds us that the reality is far more 
terrifying—that the conditions that 
transformed Heydrich into an architect 
of evil can all too easily be re-created. 
If there is a shortcoming to Hitler’s 
Hangman, it is the lack of an in-depth 
examination of Heydrich’s leader-
ship, which leaves a curious gap in our 
understanding of the man. Still, taken 
in its entirety, this book has earned a 
rightful place on the shelves of seri-
ous biographies. The lessons it offers 
are ones that should not be forgotten.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
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